UK Performance Review Q1 2026
We are missing our target by 47.9% (€1.906m actual vs. €3.656m target) because we are generating colder leads, leaking massive traffic at checkout, and relying entirely on a shrinking pool of fast-converting, high-intent buyers.
Unit margins are holding and sales-led revenue is up 45%. When the right leads arrive, we close. The issues are upstream.
4 data caveats
tl;dr
Unit economics
- CM1 flat at €1.251m, CM2 up 1.4% YoY to €1.104m
- CM3 down to €525k — marketing cost up €191k to €579k (March incomplete)
- Margin on recognised orders holding better than topline suggests
Demand quality and conversion
- Overall CVR 0.05% vs 0.12% LY.
- Every stage weaker: session→cart -29.7%, cart→checkout -24.5%, checkout→order -22.9%
- Lead cohort CVR fell from 5.4% to 0.5%: clear sign of colder demand converting less
- Google IS halved: 48.59% → 24.24%
- Positive: sales-led revenue €1.23m (+45% YoY)
Campaign cadence
- Extended lead gen phases have not translated into enough later lead revenue
- Extended phases in FY25 became ineffective for the UK
- Lead revenue share: 68.2% in Jan → 41.6% in Mar
Low-quality Meta volume
- Meta generated €200.5k attributed revenue in Q1
- 74% of Meta leads were unscored, COLD or COLD+
- HOT leads: 7.7% of volume but 44.0% of Meta-attributed revenue
Price and customer training
- Units 457→247, ASP €2,965→€4,228, no sub-£3,000 option
- Below 18% discount: CVR ≤0.02%. Above 20%: 0.05–0.24%. Customers are waiting for sales
- Not pure sticker shock as only 13.5% of closed-lost is price/no budget
Caveats
- March incomplete, sale only just started
- Glass shipping delays holding back recognised revenue (Glass Walls grew €175k→€268k)
- Wet winter amplified softness, but root cause is lead quality and funnel conversion
My read on what is happening
We're not creating sale-ready demand
- Scored leads down from 11,155 (Oct 2025) to 2,337 (Mar 2026)
- COLD CPL: €22.59→€42.45. HOT CPL: €23.01→€61.14
- Less volume, more expensive, lower quality
Our funnel has a huge leak
- Complete Checkout: 12.8% → 9.9% (Q1), March down to 8.6%
- Cold audiences may explain cart browsing, but the IC→Order drop is significant
- Root cause analysis needed from e-commerce
We are mostly converting people that would have bought quickly anyway
- Median days from Lead → Order has collapsed: 20 (Oct 2025) → 1 (Mar 2026)
- Two takes: (1) remaining converters were always high-intent, we are no longer converting further-out leads, (2) colder leads have a longer cycle the data has not yet revealed
- Jan 2026 cohort CVR reads 0.7% at ~75 days vs 4.0% for Jan 2025 at full maturity
We have priced ourselves into a narrower market
- ASP up 42.6% to €4,228 while units down 46%. No sub-£3,000 pergola option
- Discounting down 30% YoY — below 18% average discount, CVR drops to 0.02%
- Higher prices and lower discounts compound the colder demand problem. Fewer people can buy impulsively at these price points
1. Profitability and spend
The top-line miss can make the margin picture look worse than it is.
CM1 is 65.6% and CM2 57.9%, versus 58.1% and 50.3% in Q1 2025. Deterioration only appears at CM3, where marketing cost rose by €191k to €579k. This is a demand-conversion problem first, CM3 problem second.
The spend mix has shifted: Google is now 50.1% of gross channel spend (was 25.5%), Meta down from 67.3% to 48.7%. We shifted more into search and increased upper-funnel Meta prospecting through Evergreen, but conversion did not hold up enough to protect CM3.
Source: Profitability by month.csv. March 2026 is incomplete.
Show data used in this view
| Month | Net revenue | CM1 | CM1 % | CM2 | CM2 % | Marketing cost | CM3 | CM3 % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | €591,898 | €330,718 | 55.9% | €285,047 | 48.2% | €109,855 | €175,192 | 29.6% |
| Feb 25 | €780,901 | €441,721 | 56.6% | €381,272 | 48.8% | €105,578 | €275,694 | 35.3% |
| Mar 25 | €788,931 | €483,193 | 61.2% | €421,722 | 53.5% | €171,825 | €249,896 | 31.7% |
| Jan 26 | €680,748 | €450,709 | 66.2% | €397,960 | 58.5% | €220,241 | €177,719 | 26.1% |
| Feb 26 | €819,762 | €539,561 | 65.8% | €476,417 | 58.1% | €246,794 | €229,623 | 28.0% |
| Mar 26 | €405,398 | €260,513 | 64.3% | €229,298 | 56.6% | €111,502 | €117,796 | 29.1% |
Source: Profitability by month.csv.
Show data used in this view
| Month | Net revenue | CM1 | CM1 % | CM2 | CM2 % | Marketing cost | CM3 | CM3 % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | €591,898 | €330,718 | 55.9% | €285,047 | 48.2% | €109,855 | €175,192 | 29.6% |
| Feb 25 | €780,901 | €441,721 | 56.6% | €381,272 | 48.8% | €105,578 | €275,694 | 35.3% |
| Mar 25 | €788,931 | €483,193 | 61.2% | €421,722 | 53.5% | €171,825 | €249,896 | 31.7% |
| Apr 25 | €1,368,263 | €915,745 | 66.9% | €809,667 | 59.2% | €348,811 | €460,855 | 33.7% |
| May 25 | €999,736 | €671,518 | 67.2% | €593,546 | 59.4% | €229,538 | €364,008 | 36.4% |
| Jun 25 | €813,741 | €541,184 | 66.5% | €478,286 | 58.8% | €218,036 | €260,250 | 32.0% |
| Jul 25 | €751,350 | €509,126 | 67.8% | €451,058 | 60.0% | €210,480 | €240,578 | 32.0% |
| Aug 25 | €741,781 | €497,787 | 67.1% | €440,360 | 59.4% | €217,048 | €223,313 | 30.1% |
| Sep 25 | €759,460 | €492,351 | 64.8% | €433,716 | 57.1% | €262,194 | €171,522 | 22.6% |
| Oct 25 | €544,529 | €351,805 | 64.6% | €309,755 | 56.9% | €369,950 | €-60,195 | -11.1% |
| Nov 25 | €1,325,579 | €830,559 | 62.7% | €728,272 | 54.9% | €293,257 | €435,015 | 32.8% |
| Dec 25 | €326,451 | €204,106 | 62.5% | €178,953 | 54.8% | €76,028 | €102,924 | 31.5% |
| Jan 26 | €680,748 | €450,709 | 66.2% | €397,960 | 58.5% | €220,241 | €177,719 | 26.1% |
| Feb 26 | €819,762 | €539,561 | 65.8% | €476,417 | 58.1% | €246,794 | €229,623 | 28.0% |
| Mar 26 | €405,398 | €260,513 | 64.3% | €229,298 | 56.6% | €111,502 | €117,796 | 29.1% |
Source: marketing fact_marketing_costs 2026-03-18T0956.csv and Profitability by month.csv.
Show data used in this view
| Month | Meta | Influencer | Other | Attributable / CM3 Marketing Cost | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | €920,057 | €236,990 | €192 | €90,598 | €109,855 |
| Feb 25 | €1,047,193 | €401,887 | €9,398 | €128,049 | €105,578 |
| Mar 25 | €1,566,432 | €697,282 | €3,660 | €145,325 | €171,825 |
| Jan 26 | €1,087,513 | €930,567 | €27,276 | €0 | €220,241 |
| Feb 26 | €971,599 | €1,069,210 | €37,059 | €0 | €246,794 |
| Mar 26 | €738,542 | €882,987 | €4,044 | €0 | €111,502 |
Source: marketing fact_marketing_costs 2026-03-18T0956.csv and Profitability by month.csv.
Show data used in this view
| Month | Meta | Influencer | Other | Attributable / CM3 Marketing Cost | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | €920,057 | €236,990 | €192 | €90,598 | €109,855 |
| Feb 25 | €1,047,193 | €401,887 | €9,398 | €128,049 | €105,578 |
| Mar 25 | €1,566,432 | €697,282 | €3,660 | €145,325 | €171,825 |
| Apr 25 | €2,738,470 | €1,125,530 | €22,360 | €126,662 | €348,811 |
| May 25 | €2,565,688 | €1,206,201 | €36,549 | €107,678 | €229,538 |
| Jun 25 | €2,192,222 | €1,229,475 | €11,732 | €131,965 | €218,036 |
| Jul 25 | €1,817,057 | €1,094,332 | €32,919 | €70,819 | €210,480 |
| Aug 25 | €1,407,783 | €1,400,970 | €14,954 | €0 | €217,048 |
| Sep 25 | €1,310,342 | €1,186,817 | €4,725 | €0 | €262,194 |
| Oct 25 | €2,098,142 | €1,383,223 | €3,426 | €17,927 | €369,950 |
| Nov 25 | €2,316,832 | €2,380,932 | €15,064 | €31,558 | €293,257 |
| Dec 25 | €727,546 | €630,665 | €20,672 | €7,005 | €76,028 |
| Jan 26 | €1,087,513 | €930,567 | €27,276 | €0 | €220,241 |
| Feb 26 | €971,599 | €1,069,210 | €37,059 | €0 | €246,794 |
| Mar 26 | €738,542 | €882,987 | €4,044 | €0 | €111,502 |
2. Campaign cadence and Evergreen setup
We lengthened lead gen because one week was not enough for campaigns to optimise, but the longer setup has not produced enough later lead revenue. The UK still sees rapid degradation once a sale runs past its peak window, and right now lead generation is not creating enough qualified demand that converts when the sale starts.
Evergreen is directionally right — we need a bridge between sale events. The sourcing split is 81% Meta and 19% Google, so I would not kill it. We started at £150, then £150 plus a heater, which helped volume but does not feel exclusive enough. I would rework it into true early access one or two days before the Friday sale, plus VIP and the heater, so it feels different from standard always-on lead generation.
Source: weekly campaign pattern supplied in the context brief. Implied CM3 is calculated from weekly revenue and the supplied CM3 margin percentage.
Show data used in this view
| Week | Phase | Revenue (€k) | Implied CM3 (€k) |
|---|---|---|---|
| W1 | LG / EA | €55.8k | €12.2k |
| W2 | Sale | €98.8k | €18.9k |
| W3 | LG | €75.9k | €24.8k |
| W4 | LG / EA | €218.6k | €44.6k |
| W5 | Sale | €298.4k | €68.6k |
| W6 | Extended Sale | €267.1k | €48.1k |
| W7 | LG | €145.9k | €33.6k |
| W8 | LG / EA | €123.5k | €21.4k |
| W9 | Sale | €244.6k | €42.8k |
| W10 | LG | €149.8k | €26.1k |
| W11 | LG / EA | €165.4k | €29.4k |
3. Conversion funnel and channel mix
The website funnel is where the miss sits. Overall CVR is down 59.1% and every stage is weaker — traffic alone does not explain it. Google impression share has fallen from 48.59% to 24.24% (March: 12.58%). Even after shifting more budget into search, we are not capturing enough demand.
Channel mix explains why the visible picture can look misleading. Meta drove 184,423 sessions but its last-touch CVR rounds to zero at 0.0005%. That should not be read as no value — Meta is doing awareness and lead generation work that closes elsewhere. Direct and Email show cleaner last-touch conversion because they sit later in the journey.
A significant share of Meta and Google leads convert through Klaviyo email flows. Last-touch attribution credits email, not the original paid source, so Meta and Google are likely undervalued on a last-touch basis. Lead-attributed revenue (tracing back to original source regardless of final click) is the better lens, and the one used in section 4.
4. Lead engine, attribution and downstream quality
Meta generated 12,072 Q1 leads at €17 per lead versus Google Generic at €94, Direct at €175, Bing at €286. That does not mean cut Meta — HOT leads converted at 0.8–2.6% by month and produced nearly half of Meta-attributed revenue. The lower-temperature cohorts did not convert meaningfully. Google Generic's high-temperature cohorts are even stronger. The question is not whether Meta works — it is whether we are buying enough of the Meta that works.
Scored leads have fallen 79.0% from October to March and CPL has gone the wrong way across most temperatures. The content and PDP journey compounds this — colder leads need more persuasion, but the site is built for high-intent visitors. A colder audience will bounce or stall.
The system is producing colder demand, monetising too little of it downstream, and relying too heavily on the small slice of high-intent demand that still converts quickly.
Source: marketing fact_marketing_lead_attribution 2026-03-18T1842.csv.
Show data used
| Lead source | Leads | Attributed revenue | Revenue per lead |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meta | 12,072 | €200,503 | €17 |
| Google Generic | 2,569 | €241,400 | €94 |
| Google Brand | 303 | €25,413 | €84 |
| Direct | 485 | €85,025 | €175 |
| Bing | 111 | €31,722 | €286 |
Source: marketing fact_marketing_lead_attribution 2026-03-18T1842.csv. Lead-attributed revenue includes journeys that later closed through owned channels.
Show data used
Meta
| Temperature | Leads | Lead share | Revenue | Revenue per lead | Lead CVR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNSCORED | 4,449 | 36.9% | €18,634 | €4 | 0.1% |
| COLD | 3,172 | 26.3% | €25,686 | €8 | 0.2% |
| COLD + | 1,374 | 11.4% | €11,881 | €9 | 0.2% |
| WARM | 731 | 6.1% | €2,642 | €4 | 0.3% |
| WARM + | 1,336 | 11.1% | €53,446 | €40 | 0.5% |
| HOT | 924 | 7.7% | €88,214 | €95 | 1.4% |
| HOT + | 86 | 0.7% | €0 | €0 | 0.0% |
Google Generic
| Temperature | Leads | Lead share | Revenue | Revenue per lead | Lead CVR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNSCORED | 1,141 | 44.4% | €12,193 | €11 | 0.1% |
| COLD | 639 | 24.9% | €27,293 | €43 | 0.6% |
| COLD + | 230 | 9.0% | €0 | €0 | 0.0% |
| WARM | 105 | 4.1% | €0 | €0 | 0.0% |
| WARM + | 203 | 7.9% | €78,163 | €385 | 4.4% |
| HOT | 221 | 8.6% | €71,227 | €322 | 4.6% |
| HOT + | 30 | 1.2% | €52,524 | €1,751 | 20.0% |
Source: MQL Priority by time.csv.
Show data used in this view
| Month | Total scored leads |
|---|---|
| Oct 25 | 11,155 |
| Nov 25 | 6,225 |
| Dec 25 | 969 |
| Jan 26 | 3,348 |
| Feb 26 | 2,622 |
| Mar 26 | 2,337 |
| Month | COLD | COLD + | WARM | WARM + | HOT | HOT + |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 25 | €23 | €13 | €14 | €23 | €23 | €66 |
| Nov 25 | €27 | €18 | €22 | €21 | €26 | €40 |
| Dec 25 | €86 | €74 | €46 | €81 | €111 | €57 |
| Jan 26 | €35 | €49 | €41 | €67 | €54 | €55 |
| Feb 26 | €56 | €47 | €34 | €121 | €73 | €111 |
| Mar 26 | €42 | €37 | €37 | €47 | €61 | €74 |
Source: MQL Priority by time.csv.
Show data used in this view
| Month | Total scored leads |
|---|---|
| Oct 25 | 11,155 |
| Nov 25 | 6,225 |
| Dec 25 | 969 |
| Jan 26 | 3,348 |
| Feb 26 | 2,622 |
| Mar 26 | 2,337 |
| Month | COLD | COLD + | WARM | WARM + | HOT | HOT + |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 25 | €23 | €13 | €14 | €23 | €23 | €66 |
| Nov 25 | €27 | €18 | €22 | €21 | €26 | €40 |
| Dec 25 | €86 | €74 | €46 | €81 | €111 | €57 |
| Jan 26 | €35 | €49 | €41 | €67 | €54 | €55 |
| Feb 26 | €56 | €47 | €34 | €121 | €73 | €111 |
| Mar 26 | €42 | €37 | €37 | €47 | €61 | €74 |
Source: MQL Priority by time.csv.
Show data used
| Month | COLD | COLD + | WARM | WARM + | HOT | HOT + |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 25 | 0.8% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.6% | 1.1% | 4.2% |
| Nov 25 | 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.9% | 1.5% | 12.5% |
| Dec 25 | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.1% | 1.3% | 11.1% |
| Jan 26 | 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 0.0% |
| Feb 26 | 0.6% | 0.0% | 0.4% | 1.5% | 3.0% | 12.2% |
| Mar 26 | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.8% | 1.6% |
Source: Lead vs Non-Lead Revenue.csv.
Show data used
| Month | Lead revenue | Lead share | Non-lead revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | €347,072 | 57.7% | €254,185 |
| Feb 25 | €341,154 | 43.7% | €439,747 |
| Mar 25 | €496,936 | 63.0% | €291,995 |
| Apr 25 | €885,615 | 64.7% | €482,648 |
| May 25 | €625,577 | 62.6% | €374,159 |
| Jun 25 | €511,492 | 62.9% | €302,249 |
| Jul 25 | €342,750 | 45.6% | €408,600 |
| Aug 25 | €383,589 | 51.7% | €358,192 |
| Sep 25 | €400,161 | 53.1% | €352,917 |
| Oct 25 | €329,461 | 59.8% | €221,450 |
| Nov 25 | €828,783 | 63.0% | €486,334 |
| Dec 25 | €173,498 | 51.5% | €163,415 |
| Jan 26 | €464,372 | 68.2% | €216,376 |
| Feb 26 | €392,003 | 47.8% | €427,758 |
| Mar 26 | €165,829 | 41.6% | €233,016 |
Source: 7, 30, 60, 90 day Conversion Rate Development by Cohort.csv.
Show data used
| Lead month | Final cohort CVR | 30-day CVR |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | 4.0% | 3.2% |
| Feb 25 | 8.2% | 6.4% |
| Mar 25 | 4.0% | 3.1% |
| Apr 25 | 1.3% | 1.2% |
| May 25 | 1.6% | 1.1% |
| Jun 25 | 2.3% | 1.7% |
| Jul 25 | 2.3% | 1.6% |
| Aug 25 | 3.1% | 2.5% |
| Sep 25 | 1.9% | 1.6% |
| Oct 25 | 0.6% | 0.4% |
| Nov 25 | 0.6% | 0.5% |
| Dec 25 | 1.2% | 0.8% |
| Jan 26 | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| Feb 26 | 0.6% | 0.6% |
| Mar 26 | 0.3% | 0.3% |
Source: Days from Lead Creation to Order.csv.
Show data used
| Lead month | Average days to order | Median days to order |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 25 | 30.8 | 6.0 |
| Feb 25 | 15.6 | 5.0 |
| Mar 25 | 35.3 | 12.0 |
| Apr 25 | 9.3 | 4.0 |
| May 25 | 28.6 | 7.0 |
| Jun 25 | 27.9 | 4.0 |
| Jul 25 | 21.9 | 9.0 |
| Aug 25 | 26.0 | 8.0 |
| Sep 25 | 20.0 | 5.0 |
| Oct 25 | 25.5 | 20.0 |
| Nov 25 | 24.2 | 11.0 |
| Dec 25 | 24.3 | 18.0 |
| Jan 26 | 11.2 | 9.0 |
| Feb 26 | 8.0 | 5.0 |
| Mar 26 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
5. Product mix, pricing and urgency
The product mix has moved up. Units down 46% but ASP up 42.6%, driven by the shift towards Sundream and Custom plus reduced discounting, not a margin problem.
Two views: the series view shows the S2 to S3 transition, while the product-line view isolates the ongoing lines (Standard, Sundream, Skydance, Custom, add-ons). Conservatory is excluded — launch too recent to compare.
Price sensitivity is real. Below 18% average discount, CVR sits at 0.02% or lower. Above 20%, it jumps to 0.05–0.24%. Combined with the higher opening price and no sub-£3,000 option, customers are waiting for sales. The answer is not to panic on margin but to tighten event structure and urgency.
Source: Products Heatmap Over Time - 2025-01-01 - 2026-03-18.csv. Product-line view removes S1 and excludes residual 2026 clearance from Sundream so the ongoing line comparison is cleaner.
Show data used in this view
| Product line | Q1 2025 revenue | Q1 2026 revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Standard Pergola | €401,227 | €205,676 |
| Sundream | €457,698 | €463,661 |
| Skydance | €169,840 | €162,500 |
| Custom | €58,171 | €185,014 |
| Glass Walls | €174,739 | €268,186 |
| Screens | €300,134 | €188,574 |
| LED | €22,539 | €23,513 |
| Heaters | €8,290 | €14,153 |
Source: Products Heatmap Over Time - 2025-01-01 - 2026-03-18.csv. S1 and Conservatory are excluded from the series view to keep the transition readable.
Show data used in this view
| Series | Q1 2025 revenue | Q1 2026 revenue |
|---|---|---|
| S2 | €1,047,948 | €21,956 |
| S3 | €58,171 | €1,029,206 |
| Accessory / Other | €422,594 | €535,797 |
Source: Products Heatmap Over Time - 2025-01-01 - 2026-03-18.csv. Conservatory is excluded.
Show data used in this view
| Period | Pergola units | Average selling price | Pergola revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | 457 | €2,965 | €1,354,992 |
| Q1 2026 | 247 | €4,228 | €1,044,409 |
6. March and other context I would keep front of mind
March is incomplete with the sale only just started. Run rate is ~€22.5k/day — if the sale week lands between €200k and €250k, March ends -17% to -23% versus 2025, not the much worse raw gap visible mid-month. The south has had a wetter winter than the sunny 2025 benchmark, and glass shipping delays are holding back recognised revenue. Neither explains the whole miss, but both matter for how we read Q2.
Returns are not the issue. Internal analysis in December showed returns value down 32% YoY and compensation down from £8.5k to £4k. Much of what appears as a "return" is actually order modifications — customers cancelling and reordering to change specs or add products. Closed-lost points to qualification, timing and follow-up, not refusal to pay.
52% of first-time orders now go out with accessories, and we have seen significant growth in Glass Walls (€175k to €268k, +53.5%) and Screens. We were unable to ship glass for the large majority of Q1, but shipments have now arrived, allowing us to recognise the revenue.
7. Prioritised recovery plan
The plan is split into two phases. Do now is what we are changing this cycle. Do next is the structural work that follows.
- Confirm with E-Comm whether any changes were deployed to the checkout flow, payment provider, or shipping/tax display during the period
- Review all event tracking at each stage of the bottom-of-funnel: address entry, payment method selection, payment submission, confirmation
- Device and browser split analysis to identify whether the drop is concentrated on mobile or specific browsers
- Payment type and error log review: categorise failures by type (declined, timeout, 3DS abandonment, address validation)
- MS Clarity session recording and heatmap review on checkout pages
- Pull together a hypothesis alongside Rodion and deliver a recommendations report with prioritised fixes within two weeks
- Shorten lead generation to one week
- Start Early Access mid-week with genuine early access
- A/B test a two-week sale phase after reviewing the customer journey and email touchpoints
- Update the campaign calendar
- Confirm Marketing can support the change
- Weekly reporting from Emily on Sales performance per phase
- Run Evergreen alongside campaigns and switch messaging as we enter each sale phase
- Broaden the offer: heater, £150 off, exclusive VIP benefits
- Open Early Access mid-week to pull revenue into non-sale days. Keep lead signup open.
- Simplify the landing page to a singular goal: sign up
- Build mid-funnel content: quiz (draft ready), buyer's guide, customer galleries, video testimonials
- Review nurture sequences for focus
- Review budget allocations with Alexi, Colton, and Em. Determine whether this is creative, targeting, or both.
- Consider pausing broad prospecting. Audiences are too broad and not improving.
- Build lookalikes from HOT converters. Retarget website visitors with product-specific creative.
- Test new creative focused on education and social proof, not discounts.
- Review Google Generic allocation toward high-intent keywords.
- Weekly lead-quality scorecard: CPL by temperature, revenue per lead, 30-day cohort CVR by channel.
- Week-1 vs week-2 sale performance breakdown: revenue, orders, AOV, discount rate, source mix
- Review email flows and customer journey to isolate whether the issue is cadence, fatigue, sales responsiveness, or event structure
- CRM audit: time-to-first-contact, contact attempt rate, follow-up cadence
- Klaviyo sale-sequence review: map current flow, identify gaps
- Test a compressed sale format if the data supports it
- Get the PDP audit from Mike or do it ourselves
- Buyer's guide was not hooked up until recently. Link it from Meta ads and nurture flows.
- Add customer galleries and video testimonials to PDPs
- Launch the quiz (working draft ready)
- Exit intent on PDPs offering the buyer's guide to visitors who have not added to cart
- Review nurture sequences for focus
- Review pricing structure against the unit decline and the 18%/20% CVR threshold
- Have a defined plan for how we will launch the discounted units
- Analyse whether a sub-£3,000 entry-point SKU would capture demand currently lost
- Track whether entry-point buyers upgrade via accessories or return for a second purchase
| Priority | What | Owner | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | Complete full checkout root cause analysis with E-Comm | Ammar | [TBC] |
| P2 | Reset the campaign cadence | Emily | [TBC] |
| P3 | Rebuild the Evergreen setup with lower-funnel targeting | Emily | [TBC] |
| P4 | Reallocate budget on downstream yield and lead quality | Ammar | [TBC] |
| P5 | Investigate extended-sale performance and tighten the CRM loop | Ammar | [TBC] |
| P6 | Build PDP and content journey for colder audiences | Ammar | [TBC] |
| P7 | Review pricing and discount strategy | Ammar | [TBC] |
Q2 outlook
I will have an updated Q2 forecast by end of this week, reflecting the March close, the recovery actions above, and the glass backlog revenue now flowing through.